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Abstract 
Recent changes in the federal-provincial transfer system have left the Canadian 
federation in a state of vertical fiscal imbalance. Given the tax room occupied by 
the federal government and the provinces, the magnitude of transfers is 
insufficient to sustain the relative levels of expenditure responsibilities into the 
future. Sooner or later some choice must be made between ceding further tax 
room to the provinces and increasing transfers. In this paper, we outline the 
cases for each of these two courses of action, and argue that federal tax room 
should be jealously guarded and the imbalance addressed by increasing 
transfers to the provinces. The argument is based both on tax harmonization 
considerations and on the importance of federal transfers as a means of 
accomplishing national efficiency and equity objectives. 
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The Issue 
The Canadian federal fiscal system, like those worldwide, is characterized by a 
fundamental asymmetry between the revenues raised at the federal level and its 
expenditure responsibilities. The federal government raises more revenues than 
it requires for its own program spending, and transfers the excess to the 
provinces. The bulk of the transfers takes two forms: equalization, which goes to 
those provinces with below-average revenue-raising capacity, and social 
transfers, which go to all provinces on a more or less equal per capita basis. The 
provinces then have essentially the same asymmetric financial relationship with 
their municipalities.  
This asymmetry is variously characterized as a vertical fiscal gap or, more 
pejoratively, as a fiscal imbalance between the federal government and the 
provinces. It has come to the fore in the past decade because of the abrupt cut in 
federal transfers to the provinces as part of the debt reduction policies of the 
1990s, and the related perceived crisis in the funding and sustainability of 
provincial health case systems. Many observers regard fiscal imbalance as a 
fundamental problem requiring attention. These include not only policy 
economists and public policy think tanks, but also provincial governments. 
Indeed, a Quebec Commission on Fiscal Imbalance, reporting to the previous PQ 
government and chaired by the current Quebec Finance Minister, Yves Seguin, 
argued for a radical rebalancing of the federation to eliminate all but a small 
amount of the fiscal gap. Its recommendations essentially involve replacing the 
social component of existing transfers with a substantial reallocation of revenue-
raising authority from the federal government to the provinces. On the other 
hand, the Romanow Royal Commission, echoing the views of many provinces, 
has argued in favor of rebalancing in the opposite direction, such as by 
increasing social transfers to the provinces to increase the share of federal 
financing of provincial health care programs. The federal government, for its part 
seems more intent on programs that transfer funds directly to individuals and 
institutions without going through the provincial governments. These various 
options have taken on policy significance, and are likely to be prominent on the 
agenda of the Martin federal government.  
There is also a serious horizontal imbalance that is not unrelated to the vertical 
one. As a recent agreement among the Provincial and Territorial Finance 
Ministers documented, the gap in revenue-raising ability between Alberta and 
Ontario far outweighs that between Ontario and the equalization receiving 
provinces. This leads to a situation in which natural resource revenues are 
treated very asymmetrically between the have and have-not provinces. Although 
much of our concern is with vertical imbalance, our discussion will touch upon 
horizontal imbalance as well. 
Much is at stake for Canada. The resolution of the fiscal imbalance issue is of 
immense importance to the functioning of Canada’s social and economic union.  
Moreover, any change along the lines of the Seguin Report or its analogues are 
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likely to be largely irreversible at least for the foreseeable future. Thus, it is 
important that we get it right.     
Unfortunately, the terms of the debate are far from transparent. They involve 
seemingly arcane concepts like tax-point transfers, the representative tax system 
(RTS) approach used for equalization, the role of the spending power, tax 
harmonization, and the federal share of financing health care. Although these are 
not difficult in principle to understand, the fact that they involve transactions 
among governments that do not directly impinge upon citizens and their 
representatives seems to reduce all incentive to understand them and their 
implications, and makes the public policy process hostage to a subset of vocal 
policy advocates. 
My purpose is to outline what is at stake, weigh the pros and cons of various 
actions, and in the end take a position that is perhaps rather provocative. 
Before beginning, it is useful to state an important caveat. Discussion about the 
structure of the federation is far from scientific and relies on much more than 
empirical investigation, despite the fact that there is a rich body of theoretical and 
empirical research on the topic. For one thing, the main actors are 
governments—federal, provincial and municipal—and, unlike with individuals and 
firms, we are a very long way from understanding government behavior. Also, 
values are inextricably involved. Whether we like it or not, governments in their 
economic policy guise are largely institutions for redistribution broadly construed. 
It is necessary to take a stance on the redistributive role of government in order 
to take a position about how the federation should be structured. Reasonable 
people can reasonably disagree. 
 
Some Background 
Canada’s federation is a highly decentralized one, probably the most 
decentralized in the world. Spending at the provincial-local level is much higher 
than at the federal level. Exclusive legislative responsibility for major public 
goods and services are in the hands of the provinces, and these include 
significant social programs in the areas of health, education and welfare. Indeed, 
the bulk of provincial spending are for these programs, and they are among the 
most rapidly growing areas of public spending. At the same time and unique 
among federations, provinces have virtually unfettered access to revenue 
sources, and raise a substantial proportion of their own revenues. Indeed, they 
have access to more revenue sources than the federal government. 
Nonetheless, they are not fully self-sufficient and rely on federal government 
transfers for a significant proportion of their revenues.  
Over the past several decades, the federation has been gradually becoming 
more and more decentralized. Provincial program spending has grown rapidly 
relative to the federal government owing to the nature of provincial 
responsibilities, and at the same time reliance on federal transfers has gradually 
declined. Although decentralization has evolved gradually and inexorably, there 
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have been some periods of sharp and unannounced change, the most notable of 
these during the federal deficit reduction programs of the mid-1990s. The Martin 
federal budgets relied disproportionately on cutbacks of cash transfers to the 
provinces to address their fiscal objectives, thereby undoubtedly passing deficit 
problems onto the provinces (who in turn did the same to the municipalities). 
This evolving process of decentralization punctuated with various episodes of 
abrupt change illustrates what fiscal federalism specialists take for granted. Even 
though in principle, both levels of government have unencumbered access to all 
the major forms of revenue raising, the extent to which the provinces in the end 
rely on their own revenue relative to transfers from the federal government is 
endogenously determined and reflects the interdependencies of federal and 
provincial decision-making. That is, the vertical fiscal gap is what economists call 
an equilibrium outcome: it is the outcome of decisions take more or less 
independently by the two orders of government. However, it is an equilibrium 
outcome of a process in which the federal government likely has a dominant say, 
what is referred to as a first-mover advantage. Given the spending 
responsibilities of the two levels of government, the extent of fiscal gap and fiscal 
imbalance depends on the amount of tax room the federal government occupies 
and the amount of transfers it chooses to make. The provinces are bound to take 
that as given. Thus, to that extent, the vertical fiscal gap and any imbalance in 
the fiscal relations between the two levels of government is largely under the 
influence of the federal government. 
Another feature of federal-provincial interdependence is worth mentioning. The 
two levels of government undertake fiscal decision-making in the Canadian 
federation independently. To use economics jargon, fiscal decision-making and 
the federal-provincial equilibrium that results from it is more non-cooperative than 
cooperative in nature. This might be partly a result of our parliamentary system of 
government whereby fiscal decisions must ultimately be done in parliaments and 
legislatures. But it might also be due to institutional features of the Canadian 
federation. Unlike other federations, there is no arms-length federal-provincial 
advisory body that facilitates cooperative outcomes, like the Commonwealth 
Grants Commission in Australia, the Financial and Fiscal Commission in South 
Africa, or similar bodies in other federations. 
From this, two relevant observations follow. First, under our existing federal fiscal 
system, given the preemptory role played by the federal government, the balance 
of the federation to a large extent relies on federal government initiatives. It is the 
federal government that must ultimately play the major role in any rebalancing of 
the federations. Second, the non-cooperative nature of the fiscal-federal 
equilibrium limits the ability of the federal government to achieve outcomes that 
might be in the social interest. The search for mechanisms to enhance 
cooperative decision-making might be worthwhile. 
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Sorting Out Responsibilities 
Sections 91-95 of the British North America Act set out the division of the main 
legislative responsibilities of the two orders of government. To some, matters 
might end there. If the provinces have exclusive legislative responsibility for, say, 
health, one might think that they should be allowed to exercise that responsibility: 
the federal government should butt out. However, matters are not so simple for 
two main reasons. The first is that the division of responsibilities in no way 
resolves the vertical fiscal gap issue. It sets out expenditure responsibilities, and 
it provides the federal and provincial governments with taxing powers. But it does 
not require that one balance the other, so it does not resolve the determination of 
vertical fiscal gap. Virtually any fiscal gap is consistent with the constitutional 
division of legislative responsibilities. 
The second, and more important, reason is that the division of powers is largely 
functional in nature: it is not goal-oriented. No one level of government is, or can 
be made, responsible for economic efficiency in its various aspects, or 
redistributive equity, or other social goals that are part and parcel of economic 
objectives. On the contrary, policy instruments used by both levels of government 
contribute jointly to economic and social objectives construed more broadly. 
More important, the Constitution explicitly recognizes the interest and 
responsibility the federal government has for objectives that are addressed 
mainly by policy instruments that are the sole legislative responsibility of the 
provinces. To be more explicit, refer to Section 36 of the Constitution Act 1982, 
which reads:  
(1) Without altering the legislative authority of Parliament or of the 
provincial legislatures, or the rights of any of them with respect to the 
exercise of their legislative authority, Parliament and the legislatures, 
together with the government of Canada and the provincial governments, 
are committed to  
(a) promoting equal opportunities for the well-being of Canadians;  
(b) furthering economic development to reduce disparity in 
opportunities; and  
(c) providing essential public services of reasonable quality to all 
Canadians.  
(2) Parliament and the government of Canada are committed to the 
principle of making equalization payments to ensure that provincial 
governments have sufficient revenues to provide reasonably comparable 
levels of public services at reasonably comparable levels of taxation.  
Section 36(2) forms the basis for the equalization program, a program which is 
itself coming up for renewal and about which there is substantial controversy. 
Section 36(1), however, is the main source of conflict between provincial 
legislative jurisdiction and federal responsibilities. The commitments listed are all 
those that are addressed by provincial spending programs, including important 
social programs in the areas of health, education and welfare. To the extent that 
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these commitments are taken seriously, they imply some federal influence over 
provincial spending programs. 
More generally, one can argue without reference to the Constitution that there 
are economic and social objectives that have a national dimension, although 
there is certainly room for debate as to their breadth and importance. These 
include on the one hand redistributive equity in its various dimensions: social 
insurance, equality of opportunity, income equality, poverty elimination, and so 
on. There are legitimate differences between those who believe that, for 
example, equality of opportunity should be provincial rather than national in 
scope. But as a matter of principle, the view that there ought to be some 
minimum national standards of redistributive equity is a defensible position, and 
one that is implemented in at least some policy areas (e.g., the tax system, EI, 
pensions). At the same time, there are objectives of economic efficiency that are 
particularly national in nature, such as efficiency in the internal economic union 
(the absence of inter-provincial barriers to the movement of products and factors 
of production). The national dimension of these principles of redistributive equity 
and efficiency in the internal economic union have in fact been recognized by the 
provinces in parallel inter-governmental agreements: the Social Union 
Framework Agreement (SUFA) covering redistributive equity and the Agreement 
on Internal Trade (AIT) covering national efficiency. Thus, the legitimacy of a 
national role cannot be discounted lightly. 
How then can the federal government pursue these objectives, especially given 
the exclusive legislative responsibility of the provinces? Methods used in other 
federations, such as mandates and constitutional enforcement, can be readily 
ruled out. That leaves three sorts of alternatives, all of which have implications 
for the balance between federal and provincial fiscal positions.    
The spending power. The use of federal-provincial transfers with conditions 
attached is potentially the surest means by which the provinces can be 
encouraged or induced to take account of national objectives in the design of 
spending programs. However, the use of the spending power is not without 
problems, especially when it involves major provincial public services in areas of 
health, education and welfare. These programs have redistributive goals as their 
main objective and rationale, and it is much more difficult to formulate and to 
agree upon these goals, and then to interpret them. The general conditions of the 
Canada Health Act are a good example of this. This vagueness of objectives 
leads to several potential sources of friction. These include the definition of the 
conditions, the extent of intrusiveness of the federal government in provincial 
decision-making, the extent of transfers needed to enforce the spending power 
when it is first initiated and as it is subsequently maintained, the interpretation of 
the general conditions, and their enforcement by the federal government. 
Obviously these problems are made more difficult the less cooperation there is 
between the provinces and the federal government. They are also made more 
difficult the smaller the size of the transfers used to engage the spending power 
in a given provincial program. 
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Moral suasion. It is conceivable that the federal government can have 
considerable influence over provincial program design simply by combining 
federal-provincial transfers with moral suasion. This avoids the need to codify 
general conditions as well as to interpret them. The effectiveness of this will 
depend upon both the extent of cooperation between the two levels of 
government and the size of transfers. It is difficult to know the extent to which 
moral suasion has been used in the past. However, it is possible that moral 
suasion has had some implicit effect in both the welfare and post-secondary 
education areas, and that this effect waned as federal transfers declined. Thus, 
until recently, provinces treated out-of-province residents on a par with their own 
residents when it came to determining the terms under which services in these 
areas could be used. 
Federal-provincial agreement. Some of the problems with the spending power 
as a means by which the federal government exercises its responsibility for 
achieving national objectives can in principle be overcome by negotiating 
agreements with the provinces rather than applying spending power conditions 
unilaterally. However, this too is fraught with difficulties. Agreement is notoriously 
difficult to achieve, especially where near unanimity is required. A negotiated 
agreement must spell out the terms of the agreement with more precision than 
those attached to the spending power. It must include not only the conditions that 
provincial programs must satisfy, but also federal financial obligations and 
dispute settlement procedures. These difficulties account for the relative lack of 
success of federal-provincial negotiation as a means of achieving national 
objectives, except in fairly narrow policy areas. The two agreements that have 
been negotiated to address national efficiency objectives (the AIT) and national 
equity objectives (the SUFA) have had very limited success. The AIT lacks an 
effective dispute mechanism, while the SUFA is really more an agreement over 
process. It is not clear that any negotiated agreement can have a dispute 
settlement mechanism that is as effective as that used in the spending power, 
that is, federal government enforcement. 
The relevance of these alternatives is very much bound up with the nature of 
rebalancing that the federation might undergo. Before turning to that, it is 
necessary to clarify the conceptual nature of rebalancing the federation. 
 
VFG versus VFI 
We have used the two terms vertical fiscal gap (VFG) and vertical fiscal 
imbalance (VFI). A subtle but important distinction between these concepts 
should be cleared up before proceeding to more prescriptive arguments. Both of 
these concepts are highly imprecise, but the conceptual distinction between them 
is nonetheless an important one. The concept of VFG is related to one’s view of 
the optimal division of responsibilities between the federal government and the 
provinces, and the optimal exercise of those responsibilities. It is useful to take 
the division of expenditure responsibilities between the federal and provincial 
governments as given. There is much less disagreement about this than about 
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the revenue side. Expenditure responsibilities are after all set out in the 
Constitution. Suppose then that one has a view about the optimal exercise of 
these responsibilities. This leads one to a view about the optimal size of federal 
and provincial expenditures and how they are likely to evolve over time.  
Given these expenditure requirements, the issue is then how should they be 
financed. It is here that the concepts of VFG and VFI kick in. Setting aside issues 
of budget deficits, there will be a total amount of revenue that has to be raised to 
finance the sum of provincial and federal expenditures. The extent of VFG is 
equivalent to a view about how revenue-raising should be divided between the 
two levels of government. There may be various reasons why the federal 
government should be responsible for raising more revenues than it requires for 
its own spending purposes, and the provinces correspondingly less. These 
include arguments about the benefits of tax harmonization, the use of the tax 
system for national redistributive objectives, the costs of destructive tax 
competition, and the very different revenue-raising capabilities of the provinces. 
And, the need for federal-provincial transfers also factors into one’s view about 
the ideal VFG: that is, federal-provincial transfers may be desirable in their own 
right rather than being a residual determined by the separate determination of 
expenditure and taxing responsibilities. These arguments will be relevant when 
we consider the pros and cons of rebalancing later one. For now, we simply note 
that the VFG refers to the desired asymmetry in revenue-raising between the 
federal and provincial governments. The higher the VFG, the more centralized is 
revenue-raising, and vice versa. Equivalently, the more centralized is revenue-
raising, the larger should be the amount of federal-provincial transfers required to 
finance the spending at the two levels of government.  
The federal fiscal system will be in balance if federal-provincial transfers are 
sufficient to finance the optimal level of provincial and federal spending given the 
division of revenue-raising, that is, given the VFG. A VFI will exist if the level of 
transfers is not consistent with the division of revenue-raising, given expenditure 
responsibilities. There can either be a positive or a negative VFI, although given 
the preemptive nature of federal decision-making, concern is typically over the 
imbalance taking the form of inadequate transfers. In any case, the VFG and the 
VFI are conceptually distinct. It is possible to have any size VFG without any VFI, 
and it is useful to keep that in mind in what follows.1 
To repeat, there is nothing precise about these concepts. There will be 
disagreement about the optimal sizes of provincial and federal expenditures, as 
well as about the division of revenue-raising responsibilities. Moreover, given the 
independent discretion over tax policy, the division of revenue-raising cannot 
really be taken as exogenously given. The existence of federal and provincial 
public debt makes the concept even more imprecise. Nonetheless, the distinction 
                                                 
1 Conceptually, one can think of the relationship between the VFG and the VFI as follows: 
VFI=VFG-Actual Transfers. Of course, in the real world where deficit financing is possible at both 
levels of government, the concepts of VFG and VFI become blurred.  Even if one has a good idea 
of what the VFG should be in the long run, economic shocks put the federal finance off course 
making it difficult to be definite about when a VFI exists. 
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between VFG and VFI is useful as a way of organizing one’s thoughts. If one 
thinks the current fiscal system exhibits VFI but is otherwise satisfied with the 
VFG, the remedy is to increase transfers to the provinces. On the other hand, 
one may have a more fundamental problem with VFG and prefer either more or 
less decentralization of revenue-raising. 
Interestingly, the Seguin Commission understood clearly the distinction between 
VFG and VFI (without using the terminology), and even attempted to estimate 
empirically the sizes of the two. Their policy recommendation was intended to 
address both their perception about the existing VFI and their normative views 
about the VFG. In particular, they argued—convincingly in my view—that there 
was a serious VFI, brought about in large part by the substantial unilateral 
reduction in federal transfers to the provinces during the deficit reduction years of 
the Paul Martin Finance Ministry. Federal reductions in cash transfers to the 
provinces were much larger in percentage terms than reductions in other federal 
spending programs, effectively reshuffling the federal deficit problem to the 
provinces. At the same time, they argued that the underlying VFG—the division 
of revenue-raising responsibilities—was much too large. This view was not based 
on some notion of the ideal division of revenue-raising responsibility, but on the 
role of the VFG as a source of federal-provincial transfers. Their view was that 
federal-provincial transfers should only be used to fulfil equalization 
commitments, and not for any other spending power purpose, especially 
conditional grants in areas of provincial jurisdiction. The Seguin Commission 
implicitly discounted arguments about the disadvantages of a more decentralized 
tax system. They argued that the combination of eliminating the CHST transfer 
and turning over the GST to the provinces would both undo the VFI and correct 
what they saw as an underlying VFG.  
The precise recommendation of the Seguin Commission in fact makes little 
sense from the point of view of the rest of Canada. The federal GST and the 
Quebec Sales Tax (QST) are already harmonized, and by a unique arrangement, 
Quebec collects both the QST and the GST within its borders. Turning over full 
responsibility for the GST to Quebec would be a relatively simpler matter. It 
would be much more difficult elsewhere in Canada where either provincial retail 
sales taxes are not harmonized with the GST (or do not even exist, in the case of 
Alberta), or where they are harmonized but the federal government administers 
the tax. But the more important point of the Seguin Commission is their 
insistence that both a VFI and a VFG exist, and that this can only be addressed 
by a major reallocation of tax room from the federal government to the provinces 
along with a reduction in federal transfers. That the tax room reallocation cannot 
reasonably be achieved by decentralizing the GST is not a telling criticism. The 
obvious alternative of the federal government turning over income tax points to 
the provinces is a viable alternative that commentators elsewhere in Canada 
have proposed. 
This leads us to address the key issues raised by the Seguin Commission of 
whether the Canadian federation is out of balance, and if so how a new balance 
can be struck. 
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Rebalancing the Federation 
The evidence presented by the Seguin Commission pointing to a VFI in the 
current fiscal transfer arrangements is reasonably convincing. It was based on 
projections done by the Conference Board of Canada of future public expenditure 
requirements relative to revenue growth and the ability of the current structure of 
transfers to cope with it. These kinds of projections are naturally judgmental and 
have led to considerable debate and dispute, especially by the federal 
government. Without going into the details, the existence of a VFI of some 
magnitude is plausible. Taking that as a given, two interdependent questions 
arise, and they parallel the questions asked by the Seguin Commission. How 
should that imbalance be addressed? And, should the VFG be adjusted at the 
same time? 
Taken together, this is equivalent to asking what combination of changes in 
federal-provincial transfers and tax room reallocation should be undertaken to 
address the existing imbalance. The answer ultimately depends upon one’s view 
of the appropriate VFG, the issue addressed head-on by the Seguin 
Commission. To assess this issue, let us consider in turn the arguments in favour 
of a lower VFG and for maintaining the existing VFG. The former would support 
addressing the VFI by relying largely on turning federal tax room over to the 
provinces, while the latter would protect federal tax room and increase federal 
transfers to the provinces. 
Arguments for Reducing the VFG 
There are a large number of arguments for reducing the VFG and making the 
provinces more fiscally self-reliant. A list of some of the more important ones 
would include the following. 
Provincial sovereignty. Foremost in the minds of some provinces—including, 
but not exclusively, Quebec—is to eliminate the use of the spending power in 
areas of exclusive provincial legislative jurisdiction. While in principle it is 
possible to close the fiscal gap with purely unconditional transfers that do not 
impinge on provincial autonomy, the argument is that the federal government will 
always be tempted to attach conditions on transfers it makes to the provinces. To 
avoid that, one simply reduces transfers in the first place. Note that this argument 
places primacy on the optimal size of federal-provincial transfers rather than on 
the optimal assignment of revenue-raising responsibilities as the main 
determinant of the VFG. It implicitly accepts that any disadvantages that might 
arise from the decentralization of revenue-raising to the provinces, such as 
adverse tax competition, are dominated by the advantages of avoiding large 
transfers. Note also that this argument does not entail a zero VFG. Even the 
strongest proponents of reducing the VFG still regard some minimal VFG 
necessary for equalization purposes. 
Provincial versus national equity. A related argument for reducing the VFG is 
that equity should be more a provincial than a federal responsibility. Equivalently, 
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social solidarity is stronger at the provincial than at the national level. According 
to this, there is no case for the use of the spending power to induce national 
standards in social programs, nor is there a need for federal dominance in the 
income tax field in order to achieve national redistribution objectives. 
Accountability. It is argued that political accountability is enhanced to the extent 
that provinces raise their own revenues to finance their spending programs. 
Accountability to citizens might be less transparent if provinces rely heavily on 
revenues raised by another order of government. Moreover, the federal 
government is less able to account for the way in which its revenues are spent if 
they are transferred to the provinces. 
Fiscal competition. Competition among provinces can have both positive and 
negative effects. Some argue that a positive effect is the constraining effect that 
inter-provincial competition has in terms of reducing the Leviathan incentive to 
over-extend government spending and legislate excessive taxes. This, it is 
argued, outweighs the adverse effects that such competition might have, 
including the use of taxes and infrastructure spending to attract mobile factors 
from other jurisdictions, and competing down standards of social programs (the 
so-called ‘race-to-the-bottom’). One’s view of the balance between the beneficial 
and detrimental effects of fiscal competition revolve around one’s view of the 
benevolence of government and the weight one puts on equity versus efficiency 
goals. 
Federal unilateralism. Making the provinces less reliant on federal transfers will 
reduce the chances of unexpected and unannounced cutbacks in federal 
transfers such as those that have occurred in the past, especially in the mid-
1990s. The provinces argue that this leads to budgetary uncertainty and makes it 
difficult for them to plan their spending programs rationally. 
Dealing with Quebec. Reducing the VFG may be regarded as a necessary 
means of satisfying the aspirations of Quebec, aspirations that were well 
summarized by the Seguin Commission. It may well be that there is much less 
consensus in Quebec than elsewhere in Canada for a degree of national 
solidarity for minimal national standards of redistributive equity. Because of the 
presumed difficulty of an asymmetric set of fiscal arrangement applying in 
Quebec, the VFG that is minimally suitable for Quebec is taken as determining 
what can apply in the country as a whole. 
Arguments for Maintaining a Sizeable VFG 
As formidable as the above arguments might be, equally formidable are those for 
preserving a substantial VFG. The following summarizes the latter arguments.  
Tax harmonization. Whereas arguments for reducing the VFG tended to 
discount the importance of revenue-raising assignment, these play an important 
role in arguments for a VFG. In particular, the case for decentralizing expenditure 
responsibilities is viewed as much stronger than that for decentralizing revenue-
raising, and the VFG allows one to reconcile those differences. A major argument 
for preserving federal dominance in revenue-raising is that it leads to a more 
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harmonized tax system, especially for broad-based taxes. This has advantages 
for the efficiency of the national economy, for maintaining some national 
standards of redistributive equity, and for facilitating tax administration. Put 
simply, the larger the share of revenues of major tax bases occupied by the 
provinces, the more difficult it is to maintain the kind of harmonized tax system 
that we have enjoyed. There is plenty of evidence in Canada to suggest that tax 
harmonization is likely to suffer as revenues are decentralized. Some of the most 
severe problems identified by the Mintz Technical Committee on Business 
Taxation were due to provincial and municipal taxes. 
Tax competition. Related to this, it might be argued that the more decentralized 
the tax system, the more likely it is that the tax system will be used for adverse 
purposes, such as beggar-thy-neighbour policies, or simply as an instrument for 
self-destructive tax competition leading to a race-to-the-bottom in program 
spending. Of course, as the literature has shown, one might counter that 
provinces will find ways to engage in fiscal competition if the use of taxes are 
limited, and some of these other ways can be more harmful that tax competition.  
National redistributive objectives.  A VFG is indispensable to the extent that 
one views redistribution as at least partly national in nature, given that the federal 
government is the only government capable at addressing national goals. Of 
course, the extent to which redistribution is regarded as national versus 
provincial is a matter of judgment. It depends on the extent of consensus for 
redistribution and the extent to which solidarity is national versus regional. There 
are two ways in which a VFG contributes to the achievement of national 
redistributive objectives. The first is that it allows the inter-personal tax-transfer 
system to be designed with some common degree of progressivity nation-wide, 
albeit one that co-exists with provincial tax-transfer schemes. The second is that 
a VFG allows for the use of the spending power as an instrument for inducing 
national standards in provincial programs in accord with the principles set out in 
Section 36 of the Constitution Act. Given the division of legislative 
responsibilities, the use of the spending power is arguably the only effective 
policy instrument available for the federal government to fulfil these 
commitments.   
National efficiency objectives. Similar arguments apply with respect to the role 
of the federal government in addressing issues of efficiency in the internal 
economic union. In addition to the benefits of tax harmonization already 
mentioned, the spending power that the VFG enables can be used to encourage 
provinces to design their programs in ways that facilitate national efficiency. For 
example, the inclusion of mobility and portability provisions in health and welfare 
programs have that effect. 
Sustainability of equalization. The principle of equalization set out in Section 
36(2) of the Constitution Act is so far widely accepted by provinces and the 
federal government alike. Maintenance of an effective equalization program was 
a key part of the Seguin Commission’s recommendations.  More generally, an 
agreement signed in September 2003 by the Finance Ministers of all provinces 
and territories stated in its first sentence: ‘The Equalization Program is an 
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essential component of fiscal arrangements in Canada and needs to be 
strengthened to fulfill its Constitutional mandate.’ The decentralization of 
revenue-raising responsibility to the provinces makes it more difficult for the 
federal government to fulfill this mandate. It both increases the degree of 
disparities among the provinces and reduces the revenues available for the 
federal government to finance equalization. Perhaps as important, it might make 
it more difficult to maintain the political and societal consensus required to 
sustain an effective equalization program. This difficulty is already evident in the 
fact that the current system systematically avoids equalizing the most important 
source of fiscal disparity, that arising from oil and gas revenues. As the above-
mentioned Finance Ministers’ agreement documented, fiscal disparities between 
Alberta and Ontario are much greater than between Ontario and the equalization-
receiving provinces. It should be noted that the CHST system of social transfers 
is itself highly equalizing: it raises revenues nationwide to finance a system of 
roughly equal per capita transfers. Rebalancing the federation will in itself reduce 
this form of equalization, which is arguably as effective as the equalization 
system itself. 
Insurance against regional shocks. A final argument for the VFG is one that is 
sometimes emphasized in the international fiscal federalism literature.  A system 
of transfers financed by a national tax system implicitly insures residents of 
different provinces against regional economic shocks. In Canada, there has been 
some emphasis put on the stabilization role of equalization, but it obviously 
applies more generally to the entire national fiscal system. 
 
Prescriptions 
The need to rebalance the federation cannot be avoided. Given the projected 
rate of growth of provincial spending relative to that of the federal government, 
the division of tax room between the two levels of government, and the current 
structure, the existing balance is not sustainable into the future. It is true that the 
size of the imbalance is inherently an imprecise concept. And, it is made even 
more imprecise by the fact that the day of reckoning can be postponed by 
changes in the amount of public debt. But eventually some choice must be 
made—explicitly or implicitly—about how to address the impending VFI, 
especially the extent to which federal-provincial transfers should be maintained 
or increased as opposed to turning further tax room over to the provinces. There 
is much at stake for the functioning of the Canadian economic and social union. 
Turning over tax room to the provinces essentially reduces the ability of the 
federal government to use transfers to achieve national objectives, and possibly 
jeopardizes the efficiency associated with a harmonized tax system. It is also 
largely irreversible, at least in the medium term.  
The decision necessarily involves judgment of various sorts. One’s view of the 
appropriate rebalancing will depend upon: 
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• One’s view about the benevolence of government: The more one thinks of 
government as self-serving, the more one will want to decentralize revenue-
raising as a way of restraining the Leviathan tendencies of government.  One 
will be more sympathetic to a VFG the more one thinks of government as 
benevolent and acting in accordance with the consensus of its citizens. 
• One’s view about the importance of equity relative to efficiency as objectives 
of government: The more weight one puts on government as an institution for 
achieving redistributive equity, especially from the national perspective, the 
more one might view the VFG, and the spending power it entails, as an 
essential policy instrument. 
• One’s view about the actual equity-efficiency trade-off: One might downplay 
equity not so much from an ethical point of view, but also from an empirical 
point of view. If one thinks that significant efficiency is sacrificed to achieve 
redistributive equity, one will put less emphasis on the redistributive role of 
government. 
Because so much judgment is involved, reasonable people can and do 
reasonably disagree about the role of the federal government vis-à-vis the 
provinces in achieving social and economic objectives. I take the view that the 
federation should be rebalanced by increasing the size of transfers, protecting 
and possibly enhancing the VFG, and safeguarding the share of tax room 
occupied of the federal government, especially in the personal income tax. This 
view is driven by a number of considerations, including a conviction the 
redistributive equity is the most important function of government, and that in the 
Canadian context, this ought to have a significant national dimension. In 
economics jargon, the social welfare function ought to exhibit aversion to 
inequality, and all citizens ought to be treated comparably regardless of where 
they reside. That is, social citizenship ought to apply nationwide. 
This view is influenced by a number of observations about the functioning of the 
Canadian federation and its economy.  
• Governments in industrialized economies are largely institutions for 
redistribution. A substantial proportion of program spending is motivated by 
redistributive considerations. Two thirds of the federal budget consists of 
transfers for either redistributive or social insurance purposes. More like 80 
percent of provincial spending is on public services in areas of health, 
education and welfare, all of which are ultimately justified on redistributive 
grounds. The main exceptions are defense and protection, neither of which is 
particularly controversial. 
• There is convincing evidence that governments in democratic societies are to 
some extent benevolent in nature, and moreover, undertake functions that 
reflect strong equity objectives. It would be difficult to explain programs like 
EI, welfare, public health insurance, and public pensions solely on the basis 
of the self-interest of the median voter. This not to imply that governments are 
perfect, and that there is no self-serving element to their behavior. But the 
discipline of re-election and the extent of scrutiny of government behavior—
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especially at the national level—are powerful constraining devices, arguably 
much more powerful than those presumed to result from decentralization. 
• Redistributive goals of society must ultimately be based on the sort of 
consensus that exists among the citizens of the nation, what the Europeans 
refer to as social solidarity. There is evidence that considerable consensus 
exists in Canada for a national dimension of redistributive equity, that is, for 
national social citizenship. The progressive income tax system, the EI system, 
the public pension system, the equalization system, the system of refundable 
tax credits for less well-off families all incorporate national standards of 
redistributive equity. 
• There is also evidence that there is support among citizens in all regions of 
the country—including Quebec—for minimal national standards in some 
social programs that are delivered by the provinces, such as health care. 
• To the extent that one takes the Constitution seriously, the principles of 
Section 36 clearly imply a federal role in achieving important social objectives 
of a redistributive nature.  
Given these views, what does it imply for the rebalancing of the federation? That 
is, what advice would one give to a Martin government about the rebalancing of 
the federation? My advice would include the following elements. 
• The imbalance that exists between the federal government and the provinces 
should be addressed by an increase in transfers from the federal government 
to the provinces. 
• The transfers should not be contingent upon the size of the federal surplus. 
This puts all the risk on the provinces, which are less able to bear it than the 
federal government. Nor should it be contingent on federal revenues, and for 
the same reason.  That is, we should not adopt a revenue-sharing scheme 
along the lines of what is used in some countries, such as Germany. 
• The transfer system should be revised in some significant ways.  
1. Equalization should be rationalized along the lines suggested by the 
provincial and territorial Finance Ministers. In particular, we should 
move to a ten-province standard, which will bring oil and gas revenues 
into the equalization scheme. There may be some need to treat natural 
resource revenues of all sorts on a preferential basis because of the 
adverse incentive effects associated with equalizing resource 
revenues.  At the same time, the ability of the federal government to 
fund the equalization of natural resource revenues—especially the 
disparities due to oil and gas—could be improved by reforming the 
corporate tax system so that it is more effective as a rent-collecting 
device. 
2. Social transfers should be disaggregated into three component parts: 
health, welfare and post-secondary education.  
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3. The size of the transfers in each component should be sufficient to 
enable the federal government to achieve its commitments with 
credibility. These commitments include the broad conditions that 
should be written into each element. The Romanow Report indicated 
one way that the conditions applying to health care might be revised. 
Similar revisions could be studied for other social programs.   
4.  Social transfers of each type should escalate in accordance with some 
index of provincial spending requirements without unduly influencing 
provincial incentives. 
5. The allocation among provinces should reflect need. The simplest 
measures of need are demographic, and could be relatively broad. 
• The federal government should desist from introducing direct spending 
programs in areas of provincial jurisdiction and use transfers to provinces 
instead. This would include Millennium Scholarships, transfers to 
municipalities, infra structure grants, and so on. I would even argue that 
transfers to universities for chairs and infrastructure are better run through the 
provinces. 
• In the longer run, the federal share of the tax room should be jealously 
guarded and even enhanced. 
• Perhaps most important, the process of managing federal-provincial fiscal 
relations should be addressed. Currently almost all decisions with respect to 
fiscal federalism are introduced as part of the annual budget process. This 
has a number of disadvantages. Decisions tend to be taken with regard 
mainly to current budgetary concerns rather than longer-term concerns for the 
federation. They are taken behind the veil of budget secrecy, and from time to 
time result in bad surprises for the provinces. There is relatively little input 
from outside the Finance Department, and even within that department, 
federal-provincial issues seem to have relatively little priority.  Despite the 
size of federal-provincial transfers, the federal-provincial division is part of the 
branch that includes social policy and might not have the weight of, say, tax 
policy. The result is that major decisions that affect the federation are taken 
more by default than being matters of conscious policy. One way to open up 
the process and make it more transparent would be to create the kind of 
arms-length inter-governmental body that exists in other federations to advise 
on federal-provincial fiscal relations.  We have mentioned the examples of 
Australia and South Africa earlier, but other federations have similar 
institutions. Of course, these bodies cannot usurp the role of Parliament in 
passing spending bills, but they can make the process more transparent and 
accountable, and provide a vehicle for taking into account the longer-run 
consequences of fiscal actions for the functioning of the federation. 
 
